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In this paper, we provide a method to safely store a document in perhaps the most challenging
settings, a highly decentralized replicated storage system where up to half of the storage servers may
incur arbitrary failures, including alterations to data stored in them. Using an error correcting code
(ECC), e.g., a Reed–Solomon code, one can take n pieces of a document, replace each piece with
another piece of size larger by a factor of n
n − 2t + 1 such that it is possible to recover the original set
even when up to t of the larger pieces are altered. For t close to n/2 the space blowup factor of this
scheme is close to n, and the overhead of an ECC such as the Reed–Solomon code degenerates to
that of a trivial replication code. We show a technique to reduce this large space overhead for high
values of t . Our scheme blows up each piece by a factor slightly larger than two using an erasure code
which makes it possible to recover the original set using n/2− O(n/d) of the pieces, where d ≈ 80
is a f xed constant. Then we attach to each piece O(d log n/log d) additional bits to make it possible
to identify a large enough set of unmodifie pieces, with negligible error probability, assuming that at
least half the pieces are unmodifie and with low complexity. For values of t close to n/2 we achieve
a large asymptotic space reduction over the best possible space blowup of any ECC in deterministic
setting. Our approach makes use of a d-regular expander graph to compute the bits required for the
identificatio of n/2 − O(n/d) good pieces. C© 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
1. INTRODUCTION
In order to safeguard a document, the most simple solution is to replicate it and to store the different
copies in different places. Thismethod, however, has twomain drawbacks. First, the integrity ofmultiple
replicas is harder to maintain, and second the required storage space grows linearly with the number
of copies. In this paper, we provide a method to safely store a document that addresses both issues.
First, our method guarantees integrity against arbitrary alterations, even malicious ones, in up to half
of the storage servers. Second, the storage costs remain reasonable even in large systems, composed of
hundreds or thousands of servers.
Our approach makes use of an erasure code that can recover the information when some pieces
are lost but the ones that remain are guaranteed to be correct. We add verificatio information to the
code pieces in order to identify a large collection of good pieces when we reconstruct the file Several
erasure codes were suggested in the literature. We shall assume usage of the Reed–Solomon codes
with Berlekamp–Welch decoding (see [GS92] for a description of this method), whose space blowup
is optimal, though other erasure codes, e.g., [LMS+97, AL96], may be employed for efficien y with a
slight sacrific in space overhead. The verificatio information that we add to the pieces is organized in
1 Preliminary version of this paper appears as N. Alon, H. Kaplan, M. Krivelevich, D. Malkhi, and J. Stern, Scalable secure
storage when half the system is faulty, in “Proceedings of the 27th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and
Programming (ICALP 2000), Geneva, Switzerland,” pp. 576–587.
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the form of f ngerprints of particular arguments.We produce these f ngerprints using a cryptographically
secure hash function H , such as the conjectured collision-resistant SHA-1 [SHA1]. For any value v,
in an unlimited range, H (v) has f xed size (in bits). We denote this size by |H |. We assume that it is
computationally infeasible to f nd two different values v and v′ such that H (v) = H (v′). Typically,
setting |H | to 160 bits suff ces to guarantee this today, e.g., with SHA1, and hence we will assume this.
Let n be the number of pieces.We arrange the pieces in a graph, called the store graph, with n vertices,
such that each piece corresponds to a vertex. An edge exists between vertices when they cross verify
each other. A vertex v of degree d stores a collection of d ∗ k f ngerprints that transitively verify every
vertex up to distance k away from v in the graph, where k is a parameter chosen at setup time. The store
graph is a carefully chosen expander graph where the neighborhood of radius k of any vertex grows
exponentially. Herein lies a large gain. The transitive verif cation information takes only a factor k more
space than a regular f ngerprint of the adjacent pieces but verif es an exponentially larger collection of
vertices. The total storage cost for the verif cation information is O(kdn), where d is an upper bound on
the maximum degree of a vertex in the store graph.When kd 
 n, this cost is a signif cant improvement
over previous methods. The complexity of our recovery and storage algorithms is O(kdn) in addition
to the time required for decoding and encoding the erasure code of choice. Our algorithm needs to
compute, in the worst case, only kdn f ngerprints. The range of parameters which will be of particular
interest for us is when d is constant and k is O(logd n).
The store graph we employ has the property that even when up to t < n/2 of its vertices are removed,
a suff ciently large component of size(n) remains connected with diameter≤k. For this, we make use
of known constructions of expander graphs [LPS86] and prove that the required properties hold in them.
That is, we prove that if up to t < n/2 vertices are removed from an expander like that in [LPS86], even
maliciously, then there remains a component of size n/2− O(n/d) with diameter O(log n/ log d). This
improves a somewhat weaker but similar result of Upfal [U94]. This result is of independent interest
and may have other applications. Furthermore it can be extended to a setup when more than half the
vertices are removed.
The retrieval algorithm selects a vertex at random and collects all the vertices that are verif ed
by it, by a simple breadth-f rst search. We show that this selection procedure needs to be repeated
only an expected constant number of times until it collects a linear set of correct vertices. The total
number of f ngerprinting computations is bounded by O(kdn) where k = O(logd n). The computation
of f ngerprints dominates the time overhead of our retrieval algorithm over the decoding complexity of
the erasure code we use.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes related previous work and
several alternative approaches to the problem which we consider. Section 3 describes our storage and
retrieval algorithms. Section 4 proves the properties we need to hold in the store graph. Section 5 gives
some details about possible applications of our methods. We conclude in Section 6.
2. RELATED WORK AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Replication is the most simple approach for achieving resilience to arbitrary corruption of storage.
Using this approach, the alteration of data stored by replicated servers can be masked by obtaining
t + 1 identical replicas, where t is presumed to be a bound on the total number of corrupted replicas.
Unfortunately, this method has a high overhead in storing full copy of the f le at each server.
When alterations to stored data are not of concern, erasure codes solve the problem. For example,
Reed–Solomon codes with the Berlekamp–Welch decoding (described in [GS92], and used in Rabin’s
IDA scheme [Rab89]) can be used as follows. We split the f le into n − t segments, each consisting
of s/(n − t) bits, and think of these segments as representing a polynomial of degree n − t − 1 over
a f nite f eld F of cardinality p ≥ 2s/(n−t). The n pieces to store are the values of this polynomial at
n f xed points of the f eld F . Clearly we can reconstruct this polynomial from only n − t such values.
Since the total amount of space taken by n − t pieces is exactly s, the space overhead is clearly optimal.
However, if any of the obtained pieces is altered, the integrity of the reconstructed document may be
compromised. Moreover, a user obtaining such an erroneous document has no way of detecting that an
error has occurred and may simply return erroneous results undetectably.
SCALABLE SECURE STORAGE 205
To overcome this problem, it is necessary to add redundant information to pieces when they are stored
that indicates when some other pieces(s) are altered. A simple approach is to store a f ngerprint of the
entire document with each piece. To recover the f le, f rst one gets the correct f ngerprint from amajority
of the pieces and then checks combinations of pieces for a f le with the same f ngerprint. However, this
may lead to prohibitive computations in searching for a right combination of unaltered pieces.
To obtain a feasible solution that can handle alterations in at most t pieces one could use an error
correcting code (ECC). The terminology here is usually quite different. An error correcting code C of
block length N , rate K , and distance D over a q-ary alphabet , denoted by [N , K , D]q , is a mapping
from K (the message space) to N (the codeword space) such that any pair of strings in the range
of C differs in at least D locations out of N . Reed–Solomon codes are a classical and commonly used
construction of error correcting code for which D = N − K +1. The alphabet for such code is a f nite
f eld F , where |F | = q ≥ N . The message specif es a degree K −1 polynomial over F . The mapping C
maps this polynomial to its evaluation at N distinct points of the f eld F . Since two distinct polynomials
of degree K − 1 agree in at most K − 1 places it follows that D = N − K + 1. Eff cient algorithms
are known [Ber68] to recover the message from a codeword of a Reed–Solomon code despite errors in
less than D/2 values.
Translating this to our setting, we would use an ECC with N = n the number of desired pieces,
K = n − 2t + 1, and D = 2t over an alphabet which is a f nite f eld F with 2s/(n−2t+1) elements. Similarly
to our use of erasure codes, we split the f le into n − 2t + 1 pieces each of size s/(n − 2t + 1). We
think of these pieces as representing a polynomial of degree n − 2t over F . The codeword consists of
n evaluations of this polynomial. The space blowup of this method is n/(n − 2t + 1), larger than when
using erasure codes. However we are able to recover the f le despite arbitrary alterations of t pieces.
Note that when t gets close to n/2, the space blows up by a factor close to n. In particular, if t =  n−12 
this method has space blowup similar to fully replicating the f le n times.
Instead of using an ECC on the pieces themselves one can apply it to a shorter sequence of f ngerprints
of the pieces, thereby reducing the space overhead at the expense of getting only a probabilistic guarantee
for recovery. For example, the Secure IDAmethod in [Kra93] computes a f ngerprint for each piece and
stores the vector of f ngerprints using an ECC. To recover the document, f rst the vector of f ngerprints
is recovered, and then each piece is checked against its f ngerprint. The space blowup factor for storing
a document with this method is n/(n − t) for the pieces and an additional space for pieces of the
f ngerprints vector, blown up by a factor of n/(n − 2t + 1). Here, too, when t approaches n/2, the
f ngerprints vector storage is blown up by a factor n. The space for the f ngerprints vector depends only
on n and the hash function used, and does not depend on the document length. Nevertheless, this space
could be quite prohibitive when n is large. To illustrate this, suppose a f le size is 1 MB, f ngerprints are
160 bits, n = 1000, and t = 499. Then Secure IDA stores roughly 1000×160 extra bits, or≈20KBytes,
with every piece of 1 MB/(1000 − 499) ≈ 2 KBytes.
An alternative approach that can reduce the large blowup factor of ECC (either on the pieces them-
selves or on the f ngerprints) is to use recent polynomial time algorithms for the list decoding problem.
Consider the Reed–Solomon codes we previously mentioned. As we described, when the number of
errors is less than half the distance D of the code then there is a unique codeword closest to the message
and eff cient algorithms for f nding it. Therefore we picked a code such that t is no greater than half of
its distance. When there are more errors than half the distance of the code there may be more than one
possible decoding. The problem of f nding all possible decodings in such cases is called the list decoding
problem. For Reed–Solomon codes the number of possible decodings is constant as long as the number
of errors is less than N − √N K (see [GRS95]). Using techniques introduced by Sudan [Su97] and
subsequently improved in [RR00] and [GS99], one can produce this list with a randomized polynomial
time algorithm. In its most eff cient form [GS99], the algorithm can handle up to N − √N K − 1
errors.
We could use this list decoding algorithm for our purposes as follows. We pick a Reed–Solomon
code with N = n and K such that n − √nK − 1 ≥ t . So t now is greater than half the distance of
the code. In particular if t = (n − 1)/2 then we can take K = n/4. The alphabet we use is of size
2s/K where s is the size of the text we encode (that is it is either the size of the f le itself or the size of
the sequence of f ngerprints of the pieces of the f le). In addition, we store with each of the n pieces
generated by the ECC a hash H of the full document. To retrieve the document when up to t of the
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TABLE 1
Comparison of Methods: Storing Document of Size s on n Servers
When up to t = (n − 1)/2 May Be Faulty
Method Space per server Store timea Retrieve timea
Our method (2 + )s/n + O(log n) O(n log n) O(n log n)
Simple replication s none none
Reed–Solomon s none none
Secure IDA 2s/n + O(n) O(n) O(n)
List decoding 4s/n none O(n3)
a In addition to underlying coding and decoding time of the corresponding erasure or
error correcting code.
pieces are altered we f rst recover the correct hash H of the document from a majority. Then we employ
Guruswami and Sudan’s list-decoding method to obtain a list of possible decodings. Finally we pick
the decoding whose hash is H .
The space blowup of this method is constant (=4). The drawback of this scheme is the complexity
of the retrieval algorithm. This algorithm employs rather complicated methods, such as polynomial
factorization, and has complexity cubic in n.2 By comparison, our retrieval method is simpler (using
only hashing and comparisons) and runs in O(n log(n)) time. We use a completely different approach
whose building blocks may have other applications.
A comparison of the eff ciency of our method when half the system may be faulty with the various
known approaches is given in Table 1.
Going back to our basic motivation, the need for scalable and survivable storage is reinforced in
numerous recent systems that support information sharing in highly decentralized settings. Examples
are the Eternity service [And96], a survivable digital document repository, SFS [MK98], a secure
f le system for a wide area network, Fleet [MR99], a survivable and scalable data replication system, a
Byzantine f le system of Castro et al. [CL99], and IBM’s Evault [GGJ97], a storage system that employs
Rabin’s IDA to achieve survivable storage with reasonable storage burden. The verif cation information
stored in these systems to guard against possible alteration of pieces does not scale to large system
sizes. Our methods are most suitable for all the systems mentioned above and others where scaling is a
necessity.
The methods presented in this paper are concerned with the integrity of f le storage and retrieval.
Other aspects of data security are orthogonal to ours. Specif cally, methods for preserving the secrecy
of f le contents in replicated systems have been proposed, e.g., in [HT88, AE90], such that the collusion
of up to t faulty servers cannot reveal the contents of the information stored. These methods use secret
sharing techniques that can be combined with our approach to achieve secrecy.
3. STORING AND RETRIEVING A DOCUMENT
The goal of this work is to provide two functions, share and reconstruct. Function share takes a doc-
ument x and produces n pieces denoted by share(x, 1), . . . , share(x, n) to be stored in n corresponding
servers. Function reconstruct recovers the document with high probability despite arbitrary alterations
in up to a threshold t =  n−12  of the pieces.
3.1. Share
Our solution transforms x using Reed–Solomon ECC into n pieces, ECC(x, 1), . . . , ECC(x, n),
such that x can be restored from any subset of ( n2 − n) pieces ( will be determined in Section 4).
To safeguard against alteration of pieces, we add to each piece verif cation information as follows. We
arrange the n ECC pieces in a particular graph on n vertices; each piece corresponds to a vertex of
the graph. We call this graph the store graph and specify it precisely in Section 4. We def ne k levels
2 The method by Roth and Ruckenstein [RR00] has computation complexity O(n2 log2 n) but needs twice as much space.
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of verification information associated with each vertex in the store graph recursively. We denote the
verif cation information of level l associated with vertex j by V l( j). The verif cation information of
level 0 associated with vertex j is its ECC piece; i.e., V 0( j) = ECC(x, j). For 1 ≤ l ≤ k we def ne
V l( j) = 〈H(V l−1j1 ), . . . , H(V l−1j|N ( j)|)〉,
where N ( j) = { j1, . . . , j|N ( j)|} is the set of neighbors of vertex j . In other words the level l verif cation
information associated with vertex j is the tuple of hashes of the level l − 1 verif cation information
associated with its neighbors. Intuitively, V l( j) verif es vertices at distance at most l from vertex j .
The information we store with server j , share(x, j), consists of k levels of verif cation information
associated with vertex j , V l( j), 0 ≤ l ≤ k (where the f rst level is the j th ECC piece). For every server
j , share(x, j) also contains the hash of the whole f le, H (x). In what follows we identify server j with
vertex j of the store graph. Therefore we will refer to servers corresponding to vertices adjacent to
vertex j in the store graph the neighbors of server j .
The total space taken by each piece of a document of size s stored with our method is at most
|H |(dk + 1) + s(
n
2 − n
) ,
where d is the maximum degree of a node in the store graph. When dk = o(n), we get a signif cant
improvement over error correcting codes.
To get some intuition about our scheme suppose server u maliciously alters its ECC piece. The hash
of the ECC piece of server u is part of the verif cation information of level one stored at the neighbors of
u. Therefore by inspecting the verif cation information of level one stored at an honest server adjacent
to server u we will be able to detect that server u altered its data. However, the servers adjacent to server
u may collaborate with server u and maliciously alter their shares. In case all the neighbors of server
u maliciously collaborate with server u we can still detect it using the verif cation information of level
two of a server at distance two from u. Let y be such a server and let z be the common neighbor of
vertices y and u. To collaborate with server u vertex z had to change its verif cation information of
level one to contain the hash of the modif ed ECC piece of vertex u. Therefore if y is honest the hash
of the modif ed verif cation information of level one of z will be different from what is stored with
the verif cation information of level two of y. In general if we get shares of a connected subgraph of
vertices of diameter at most k, then we can detect that there exists an altered ECC piece of a server in
the subgraph if the subgraph contains at least one honest server. To retrieve the document we will f nd
a connected subgraph with suff ciently many good vertices. The store graph will guarantee that such a
subgraph exists.
More generally, during retrieval, up to t servers may be corrupted, and hence, some set D of edges
incident with t ≤  n−12  vertices in the store graph are removed. Notice that we do not know who the t
corrupt vertices are and get to see a graph after deleting only the edges in D that are a subset of the edges
incident with those t corrupt vertices. Nevertheless, using k-transitive verif cation, we know that every
neighborhood of diameter k is either all correct or all corrupt. Hence, our graph construction needs to
guarantee that after the removal of the set D of edges incident with t vertices from ST , there remains a
set of n2 − n good vertices that are connected with a low diameter.
The desired properties of the store graph are therefore as follows. To reduce the storage overhead
we would like the maximum degree of the store graph to be small. We also want to guarantee safe
retrieval using a small number of levels of verif cation information. In order to retrieve the document
we will need to guarantee the existence of a large connected component of diameter at most k of honest
servers despite arbitrary faults in t other servers. Since the space overhead is proportional to the product
of d and k, we can trade a higher degree and expansion for a smaller number of levels of verif cation
information.
To achieve these properties, the store graph will be an expander graph where in a radius logarithmic
from any server we have linearly many other servers. This way we get a large number of servers
verifying any one particular server for a given number of levels of verif cation information. In Section 4
we proceed to show such a construction.
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3.2. Reconstruct
The goal of the reconstruct transformation is to take n shares, share(x, j), 1 ≤ j ≤ n, retrieved from
the servers, up to t of which may be arbitrarily altered (or missing altogether, in which case we consider
them as 0) and to return the original document x . That is, given a set of pieces {r1, . . . , rn} containing at
least n − t original pieces {share(x, i1), . . . , share(x, in−t )}, we want reconstruct(r1, . . . , rn) = x (with
high probability). Note that we need to keep reconstruct feasible as n grows despite the uncertainty
concerning up to t of the pieces. Hence, we cannot exhaustively scan all combinations of n − t pieces
to f nd a correct one.
Consider the set {r1, . . . , rn} of retrieved pieces. Each such piece, say r j , presumably contains the k
levels of verif cation information V l( j), 0 ≤ l ≤ k, and H (x). We say that ri and r j are consistent if
the following conditions hold:
1. Vertices i and j are adjacent in the store graph.
2. For every 1 ≤ l ≤ k, V l( j) contains the hash of V l−1(i) in the position corresponding to vertex
i in its tuple.
3. For every 1 ≤ l ≤ k, V l(i) contains the hash of V l−1( j) in the position corresponding to vertex
j in its tuple.
We def ne the retrieve graph as a subgraph of the store graph in which we keep the edges only
between consistent vertices. If i and j are adjacent in the store graph and honest then clearly they will
be adjacent in the retrieve graph. Therefore the edges missing in the retrieve graph are adjacent with
the t corrupt servers.
A critical property of the store graph which we prove in Section 4 is the following.
Property 3.1. If we delete t vertices from the store graph then in the remaining graph there exists a
connected subgraph with n2 − n vertices and diameter at most k.
Property 3.1 guarantees the existence of a large connected component containing a large number of
honest servers. Recall, however, that we obtain the retrieve graph from the store graph by deleting a
subset of the edges incident to the corrupt servers and not the corrupt servers themselves. Therefore the
large component of honest servers guaranteed by Property 3.1 may contain also corrupt vertices. We
may also have a large component of corrupt servers. To identify the good servers we will also use the
following lemma showing that all vertices at distance at most k in the retrieve graph from an honest
server even if corrupt must have unaltered ECC pieces. It follows from this lemma that in a connected
subgraph of diameter at most k of the retrieve graph either all ECC pieces (verif cation information of
level zero) are correct or all servers are corrupt.
Let I be a set of vertices in the retrieve graph. We let N 1(I ) = N (I ) be the set of vertices adjacent
to vertices in I in the retrieve graph. Also we denote by N k(I ) the set of vertices within a distance no
greater than k to a vertex in I . We prove the following lemma about the retrieve graph.
LEMMA 3.2. Let I be a set of honest servers. Then every vertex in N y(I ), where y ≤ k, has its first
k − y levels of information unaltered.
Proof. By induction on y. For the basis of the induction, we examine the immediate neighborhood of
I . Since all k-levels of verif cation information in each ri ∈ I are unaltered, for each immediate neighbor
r j ∈ N (I ) the hash values H (V 0(r j )), . . . , H (V k−1(r j )) storedwith the verif cation information of levels
1, . . . , k of some ri ∈ I are unaltered. Since ri and r j are connected in the retrieve graph, H (V i (r j ))
matches the hash of V i (r j ) for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. So by the cryptographic assumption on the f ngerprints
V 0(r j ), . . . , V k−1(r j ) must be unaltered.
For the induction step, assume that the lemma holds for y′ < y. Hence, every vertex in N y−1(I ) has
its f rst k − (y − 1)-levels of verif cation information unaltered. But since N y(I ) = N (N y−1(I )) by an
argument as for the base case stated above using I ′ = N y−1(I ) and k ′ = k − (y −1), we obtain that each
vertex in N (I ′) has k ′ − 1 = k − (y − 1)− 1 levels of verif cation information unaltered, as desired.
Property 3.1 says that a connected subgraph of honest servers of size close to n/2 and diameter k
exists. We denote that subgraph by W . A random vertex belongs to W with probability close to 1/2.
Our algorithm picks a random vertex v and collects all vertices in N k(v). If indeed v belongs to W then
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all W is contained in N k(v) so |N k(v)| ≥ n2 − n. Furthermore by Lemma 3.2 we know that the ECC
share of every vertex in N k(v) is correct. Therefore using the ECC shares of the vertices in N k(v) we
will recover the f le. In case v is not in W it is possible that |N k(v)| < n2 − n. But another possibility is
that |N k(v)| ≥ n2 −n and all the vertices in N k(v) maliciously changed their shares. Therefore we need
a way to distinguish between a good and large neighborhood of an honest server and a bad and large
neighborhood of a malicious server. To that end we use the hash, H (x), of the whole f le stored with
each server. We recover H (x) from each of r1, . . . , rn and if these values differ we decide on the correct
value by taking the value that occurs most often. Since more than half of the servers are honest we are
guaranteed to recover H (x) correctly. Then we recover the f le using a large neighborhood N k(v). If
the hash of the recovered f le matches H (x) we know that v was honest. Otherwise we know that v is
corrupt so we discard N k(v) and repeat this process. Here is a detailed description of our algorithm.
1. Let S = {r1, . . . , rn}.
2. Let h be the value of H (x) that occurs in  n+12  pieces in S.
3. Pick a node ri ∈ S at random;
4. If |N k(ri )| < n/2 − n set S = S \{ri } and go back to step 3.
5. Get all the pieces from N k(ri ), reconstruct a document xˆ using ECC, and check that H (xˆ) = h.
If so, return xˆ else set S = S \{{ri } ∪ N k(ri )} and go back to step 3.
This algorithm has constant overhead over the complexity of recovering the f le using ECC. Since the
size of W is close to n2 the expected number of iterations, until we draw a vertex v ∈ W and terminate,
is close to 2.
4. THE STORE GRAPH
We consider the problem of f nding a store graph ST such that when an arbitrary set D of edges
incident with a set of t =  n−12  malicious vertices is deleted there is still a large component with small
diameter in the remaining part. We handle this case by picking a graph such that after the deletion
of any set of t vertices we are guaranteed to have a set of almost n − t vertices connected with a
small diameter, say k, where we stipulate that k = O(log n/log d). In the following we show that well-
known expander graphs [LPS86] satisfy our requirements. Namely, after deleting an arbitrary set of
t =  n−12  vertices, the remaining set of vertices contains a subgraph of size n2 − O( nd ) and of diameter
k = O(log n/log d), where d ≥ 80 is a constant. The main result proved in the remainder of this section
is given in Theorem 4.1 below. Upfal proved in [U94] a similar result with somewhat weaker numerical
constants.
THEOREM 4.1. In an LPS expander [LPS86] with d > 80, if one deletes half of the vertices then
there is a vertex w such that n/2− O(n/d) of the remaining vertices are at distance O(log n/log d)
from w.
We shall use the following result of Alon et al. [AFWZ95].
THEOREM 4.2. Let G = (V, E) be a d regular graph such that the absolute values of the eigenvalues
of its adjacency matrix but the largest are no greater than λ. For a set B ⊆ V, |B| = µ|V |, let P be
the set of walks of length k (edges) that are all contained in B. Then,
|B|dk
(
µ − λ
d
(1 − µ)
)k
≤ |P| ≤ |B|dk
(
µ + λ
d
(1 − µ)
)k
.
Wedo not intend to reproduce the proof of the above statement here. However, an intuitive explanation
of Theorem 4.2 can be helpful for the reader. Clearly, the total number of walks of length k starting
in B is |B|dk (f rst choose a starting point in B, and then make k steps, each time choosing one of
the d edges leaving a current vertex). If the edge distribution in G is uniform enough and the set B
is large enough, one can expect a random walk to stay inside B with probability about |B|/n = µ at
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each step. Therefore, the probability that a random walk of length k stays inside B should be about µk .
Theorem 4.2 supports this intuitive explanation quantitatively.
Proof (of Theorem 4.1). Fix a set B ⊆ V , |B| = 12n (we assume to simplify the presentation that n
is even). For a vertex v ∈ B denote by Pv the set of walks of length k that start at v and never leave B.
If follows from the lower bound in Theorem 4.2 that there is a vertex w ∈ B for which
dk
(
1 − λd
2
)k
≤ |Pw|. (1)
Denote by C the set of vertices occurring on walks in Pw. We claim that if
k = log n
log
(
1− λd
2(c + λd (1− c))
)
then |C | ≥ cn. Otherwise, |C | < cn, and from the upper bound in Theorem 4.2 we obtain that
|Pw| < cndk
(
c + λ
d
(1 − c)
)k
. (2)
Combining the lower bound in (1) and the upper bound in (2) we obtain that
k <
log n
log
(
1− λd
2(c + λd (1− c))
) ,
in contradiction with our choice of k.
In particular, for c = 3( λd )2 we obtain that there is a vertex w ∈ B such that there are at least 3( λd )2n
vertices within distance
k = log n
log
(
1− λd
6( λd )
2 + 2 λd − 6( λd )
3
) (3)
from w in B. If we take an LPS expander then λ = 2√d − 1. It is easy to check that for λ = 2√d − 1
and d > 80, one has (1 − λd )/(6( λd )2 + 2 λd ) > 1. Therefore, we obtain that if G is an LPS expander
with d > 80 then there is a vertex w ∈ B such that 3( λd )2n of the vertices of B are at distance at most
O(log n/log d) from w in B. (Notice that the constant hidden by the big-O approaches 2 as d goes to
inf nity.)
From Lemma 2.4 in Chapter 9 of [AS92] it follows that if between two sets B and C such that
|B| = bn and |C | = cn there is no edge then
|C |b2d2 ≤ λ2b(1 − b)n,
so bc ≤ ( λd )2(1 − b).
From this we get the following consequences:
1. Theremust be an edge between any set of size 3( λd )
2n and any set of size ( 12 − λd )n if λ/d < 1/4.
2. There is an edge between every two sets of size λd n.
3. There is an edge between any set of size ( 12 − λd )n and any set of size ed n if e ≥ ( λ
2
d )(
1/2+ λ/d
1/2− λ/d ).
For LPS expanders with d > 80, we have that λ/d < 1/4 and furthermore the condition in (3) holds
for e ≥ 11. Therefore we obtain that the set of vertices within distance k + 3 from w where k is def ned
as in (3) is of size at least (1/2− 11/d)n. (Notice that e is small and goes to 4 as d goes to inf nity.)
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For the sake of the completeness of our presentation we provide now a description of the LPS graphs.
Let p, q be primes congruent to 1 modulo 4 and such that p is a quadratic residue modulo q. As
usual, denote by PSL(2, Zq ) the factor group of the group of all two by two matrices over GF(q) with
determinant 1 modulo its normal subgroup consisting of the scalar matrices ( 1 00 1 ) and (
−1 0
0 −1 ). A well-
known theorem of Jacobi asserts that there are precisely p + 1 four-tuples a = (a0, a1, a2, a3) such that
a0 is an odd positive integer, a1, a2, a3 are even integers, and a20 + a21 + a22 + a23 = p. With each such
vector a we associate the matrix γa ∈ PGL(2, Zq ),
γa =
(
ao + ia1 a2 + ia3
−a2 + ia3 a0 − ia1
)
,
where i is a f xed integer satisfying i2 ≡ −1(mod q). By the assumption that p is a quadratic residue
moduloq, all thesematrices have as their determinants a square inGF(q) and therefore can be normalized
so that they lie in PSL(2, Zq ). The LPS graph X p,q is def ned then as the Cayley graph of PSL(2, Zq )
with respect to the above p + 1 matrices. (The Cayley graph of a group G with respect to a symmetric
set of elements S is the graph with vertex set G and edges (x, y) if x = sy and s ∈ S). The graph X p,q is
a d = p + 1-regular graph on n = q(q2 − 1)/2 vertices, whose eigenvalues, besides p + 1, are at most
2
√p in their absolute values. The proof of the last fact can be obtained by applying results of Eichler
and Igusa concerning the so-called Ramanujan conjectures. We direct the reader to [LPS86] for more
details.
To summarize we can f x our store graph ST to be an LPS expander with d > 80. In this case the
 which we used in previous sections is O(1/d) and the number of levels of verif cation we need is
k = O(logd n).
5. A SECURE STORAGE SYSTEM
The application context of our work is a secure storage system. The system consists of a set S of n
servers denoted u1, . . . , un , and a distinct set of clients accessing them. Correct servers remain alive and
follow their specif cation. Faulty servers, however, may experience arbitrary (Byzantine) faults; i.e., in
the extreme, they can act maliciously in a coordinated way and arbitrarily deviate from their prescribed
protocols (ranging from not responding to changing their behavior and modifying data stored on them).
Throughout the run of our protocols, however, we assume a bound t =  n − 12  on the number of faulty
servers. Clients are assumed to be correct, and each client may communicate with any server over a
reliable, authenticated communication channel. That is, a client c receives a message m from a correct
server u if and only if u sent m, and likewise u receives m ′ from c iff c sent m ′. Furthermore, we assume
a known upper bound τ on the duration of a round-trip exchange between a client and a correct server:
i.e., a client receives a response to message m sent to a correct server u within at most τ delay. In our
protocols, we need not make any assumption on, nor employ communication among, the servers.
The storage system provides a pair of protocols, store and retrieve, whereby clients can store a
document x at the servers and retrieve x from them despite arbitrary failures to up to t servers. More
precisely, the store and retrieve protocols are as follows:
store: For a client to store x , it sends a message 〈store, x〉 to each server in S and waits for
acknowledgment from n − t servers.
retrieve: For a client to retrieve the contents of x , it contacts each server in S with a request
〈retrieve〉. It waits for a period of τ to collect a set of responses A = {au}u∈S , where each au is either a
response of the form 〈piece, xu〉, if u responded in time, or⊥ if the timeout expired before u’s response
was received. The client returns reconstruct(A) as the retrieved content.
Each server ui that receives a message 〈store, x〉 stores locally the value share(x, i). When a server
u receives a 〈retrieve〉 request it promptly responds with the currently stored piece.
A few points are worthy of noting in this description. First, due to our failure model, a client may
receive more than n − t responses to a query, albeit some undetectably corrupted. By assumption,
though, the retrieved set A will contain n − t original pieces, and hence, our share and reconstruct
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algorithms above guarantee that reconstruct(A) yields the original stored content of x . Second, the store
protocol assumes that the computation of each piece is done by each individual server. This is done for
simplicity of the exposition. Another possibility would be for a client or some gateway between the
clients and servers to f rst compute the pieces share(x, 1), . . . , share(x, n) and then send each piece to
its corresponding server. The latter form saves computation time by performing it only once at the
client (or the gateway) and comes at the expense of increasing the load on the client during a store
operation. Both forms can be supported (in a similar manner to [GGJ97]) and are orthogonal to the
discussion here. Third, during a retrieve operation the client may optimize access to the servers, e.g., by
contacting an initial set of n − t servers, which will suff ce in the normal faultless state of the system,
and dynamically increasing it only as needed. Such methods are extensively discussed in the relevant
literature on distributed systems and replicated databases and are not the main focus of the work at
hand. Finally, for simplicity, we have assumed that store and retrieve operations do not overlap, though
in practice, concurrency control mechanisms must be applied to enforce this.
6. DISCUSSION
Our research leaves open a number of issues. First, our constants, in particular the degree d, are
rather large, and hence the results are benef cial for very large systems only. We are looking for graph
constructions facilitating our methods for smaller system sizes. One such family of candidates is f nite
projective geometries [Bat97, A86].
Second, our adversarial assumption is rather strong, namely, fully adaptive malicious adversary,
and it might be possible to improve eff ciency if we adopt a weaker adversarial model. In particular,
one might accept in practice a nonadaptive adversarial model, that is, one that gives the adversary
t randomly chosen servers to corrupt. We have intuition that indeed, in this setting, smaller system
sizes may be workable. Our intuitive direction is as follows: We can make use of a random graph—
G(n, p)—in which each edge (i, j) exists with probability p. It is known that for such random graphs,
connectivity occurs at p = (log n + ω(n))/n (with diameter d = O(log n/log log n)), where ω(n) is an
arbitrarily slowly growing function of n and that the diameter becomes 2 at p = (√(log n)/n) (See,
e.g., [Bollobas85]). Due to the independent selection of edges, any subgraph G ′ of G(n, p), induced
by removal of t randomly selected vertices, is itself a random graph. Hence, it is also connected with a
small diameter. Other candidates to achieve better results in the weaker adversarial model are random
regular graphs. These intuitive directions appear to provide a viable solution for smaller system sizes
than our current results, though their exact details need to be further explored. In particular, it should be
determined for such methods the probability that the resulting subgraph after removal of faulty vertices
is not connected with small diameter.
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